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ABSTRACT
Numerous studies have shown that diagnostic
failure depends upon a variety of factors.
Psychological factors are fundamental in
influencing the cognitive performance of the
decision maker. In this first of two papers, we
discuss the basics of reasoning and the Dual
Process Theory (DPT) of decision making. The
general properties of the DPT model, as it applies
to diagnostic reasoning, are reviewed. A variety
of cognitive and affective biases are known to
compromise the decision-making process. They
mostly appear to originate in the fast intuitive
processes of Type 1 that dominate (or drive)
decision making. Type 1 processes work well
most of the time but they may open the door for
biases. Removing or at least mitigating these
biases would appear to be an important goal.
We will also review the origins of biases. The
consensus is that there are two major sources:
innate, hard-wired biases that developed in our
evolutionary past, and acquired biases
established in the course of development and
within our working environments. Both are
associated with abbreviated decision making in
the form of heuristics. Other work suggests that
ambient and contextual factors may create high
risk situations that dispose decision makers to
particular biases. Fatigue, sleep deprivation and
cognitive overload appear to be important
determinants. The theoretical basis of several
approaches towards debiasing is then discussed.
All share a common feature that involves a
deliberate decoupling from Type 1 intuitive
processing and moving to Type 2 analytical
processing so that eventually unexamined
intuitive judgments can be submitted to
verification. This decoupling step appears to be
the critical feature of cognitive and affective
debiasing.
INTRODUCTION
Clinical decision making is a complex
process. Clinical decisions about patient’s
diagnoses are made in one of two modes:
either intuitive or analytical, also referred
to, respectively as Type 1 and Type 2 pro-
cesses. The former are more commonly
used. They are fast, usually effective, but
also more likely to fail. As they are largely
unconscious, mistakes—when they occur
—are seldom corrected.1–3 In contrast,
Type 2 processes are fairly reliable, safe
and effective, but slow and resource inten-
sive. The intuitive mode of decision
making is characterised by heuristics—
short-cuts, abbreviated ways of thinking,
maxims, ‘seen this many times before’,
ways of thinking. Heuristics represent an
adaptive mechanism that saves us time
and effort while making daily decisions.
Indeed, it is a rule of thumb among cogni-
tive psychologists that we spend about
95% of our time in the intuitive mode.4
We perform many of our daily activities
through serial associations—one event
automatically triggers the next with few
events of deliberate, focused, analytical
thinking. We have a prevailing disposition
to use heuristics, and while they work
well most of the time, they are vulnerable
to error. Our systematic errors are termed
biases,3 and there are many of them—
over a hundred cognitive biases5 and
approximately one dozen or so affective
biases (ways in which our feelings influ-
ence our judgment).6 Bias is inherent in
human judgment, and physicians are, of
course, also subject to them.
Indeed, one of the principal factors
underlying diagnostic error is bias.7–9
Post hoc analyses of diagnostic errors10 11
have in fact suggested that flaws in clin-
ical reasoning rather than lack of knowl-
edge underlie cognitive diagnostic errors,
and there is some experimental evidence
that, at least when problems are complex,
errors were associated with intuitive judg-
ments and could be repaired by analytical
reasoning.12–14 Moreover, a few experi-
mental studies have supported the claim
that bias may misdirect diagnostic reason-
ing, thus leading to errors.15 16 While the
evidence for the role of bias in medical
diagnostic error is still scarce, research
findings in other domains1 3 is sufficient
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to justify concerns with the potential adverse influ-
ence of bias on diagnostic reasoning. Two clinical
examples of biased decision making leading to diag-
nostic failure are given in Case 1 and Case 2, dis-
played, respectively, in boxes 1 and 2. From the case
descriptions, the mode of decision making the phys-
ician was relying upon cannot be determined. This is
indeed a limitation of studies on diagnostic reasoning,
which only have indirect evidence or post hoc infer-
ence of reasoning processes, at least until other tools
such as functional MRI (fMRI) can be experimentally
employed.
In this first paper, we discuss how biases are gener-
ated, and situations that make physicians more vulner-
able to bias. Building upon dual process theories
(DPTs) of reasoning,1 3 we discuss the origins of
Box 1 Example of biased decision making leading
to diagnostic failure: case 1
A 55-year-old man presents to a walk-in clinic towards
the end of the evening. It has been a busy day for the
clinic and they are about to close. His chief complaint is
constipation. He has not had a bowel movement in
4 days, which is unusual for him. He complains of pain
in his lower back and lower abdomen and also some tin-
gling in his legs. He thinks that he will feel better with a
laxative because what he has tried so far has not
worked. He was briefly examined by the physician who
did not find anything remarkable on his abdominal
examination. There was some mild suprapubic tender-
ness, which was attributed to the patient’s need to
urinate. Bowel sounds were good, his abdomen was soft
and there were no masses or organomegaly. The phys-
ician prescribed a stronger laxative and advised the
patient to contact his family doctor for further follow-up.
During the night, the patient was unable to urinate
and went to the emergency department. On examination,
his lower abdomen appeared distended and he was
found to have a residual volume of 1200cc on catheter-
isation. His rectum was markedly distended with soft
stool that required disimpaction. He recalled straining his
lower back lifting about 4 days earlier. The emergency
physician suspected cauda equina syndrome and this was
confirmed on MRI. He was taken immediately to the
operating room for surgical decompression. He did well
postoperatively and regained full bladder control.
Comment: The patient was initially misdiagnosed and
might have suffered permanent loss of bladder function
requiring lifelong catheterisation. The principle biases for
the physician who saw him in the clinic were framing,
search satisficing and premature diagnostic closure.
These may have led to the incomplete history-taking, an
incomplete physical exam, failure to consider symptoms
that appeared discordant with constipation (back pain,
leg paresthesias) and to consider other diagnoses.
Fatigue may have been a contributing factor; it is known
to increase the likelihood of defaulting to System 1 and
vulnerability to bias (for a description of particular cogni-
tive biases, see ref. 7 17 18).
Box 2 Example of biased decision making leading
to diagnostic failure: case 2
A mildly obese, 19-year-old woman is admitted to a psy-
chiatric hospital for stabilisation and investigation. She
has suffered depressive symptoms accompanied by
marked anxiety. Over the last week she has had bouts of
rapid breathing which have been attributed to her
anxiety. However, she has also exhibited mild symptoms
of a respiratory infection and the psychiatry resident
transfers her to a nearby emergency department (ED) of
a tertiary care hospital to ‘rule out pneumonia’. She is on
no medications other than birth control pills. At triage,
she is noted to have an elevated heart rate and respira-
tory rate. She is uncomfortable, anxious and impatient,
and does not want to be in the ED. She is noted to be
‘difficult’ with the nurses.
After several hours she is seen by an emergency medi-
cine resident who finds her very irritable but notes
nothing remarkable on her chest or cardiac examination.
However, to ensure that pneumonia is ruled out he
orders a chest X-ray. He reviews the patient with his
attending noting that the patient is anxious to return to
the psychiatric facility and is only at the ED ‘because she
was told to come’. He expresses his view that her symp-
toms are attributable to her anxiety and that she does
not have pneumonia. Nevertheless, he asks the attending
to review the chest X-ray to ensure he has not missing
something. The attending confirmed that there was no
evidence of pneumonia and agreed with the resident
that the patient could be returned to the psychiatric
hospital.
While awaiting transfer back to the psychiatric hospital
the patient requests permission on several occasions to
go outside for a cigarette and is allowed to do so. Later,
on the sidewalk outside the ED, the patient has a cardiac
arrest. She is immediately brought back into the ED but
could not be resuscitated. At autopsy, massive pulmonary
saddle emboli are found as well as multiple small emboli
scattered throughout both lungs.
Comment: The patient died following a diagnostic
failure. Various cognitive and affective biases are evident.
The principle ones are framing, diagnostic momentum,
premature diagnostic closure and psych-out error7 (see
ref. 7 for a description of the biases). The patient’s
demeanour towards staff and the resident may have
engendered some negative antipathy which may have
further compromised decision making.
Narrative review
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biases, and the theoretical basis of how cognitive
debiasing actually works. In the second paper, we
summarise the known strategies for cognitive debias-
ing that have been proposed to counteract different
types of biases.
Biases are ‘predictable deviations from rationality’.19
Many biases that diagnosticians have can possibly be
recognised and corrected. Essentially, this is the
process that underlies learning and refining of clinical
behaviour. We may have acquired an inappropriate
response to a particular situation that, in turn, leads
to a maladaptive habit. Through feedback, however,
or other processes, some insight or revelation occurs
and we are able to change our thinking to achieve a
more successful outcome. The basic premise is that if
we can effectively debias our thinking, from innate
and learned biases, we will be better thinkers and
more accurate diagnosticians.
Clinical decision making is a complex process.
Besides the overall vulnerability of the human mind
towards biases in decision making, it is generally
appreciated that the quality of decision making is also
influenced by ambient conditions: prevailing condi-
tions in the immediate environment—context, team
factors, patient factors, resource limitations, physical
plant design and ergonomic factors. Individual factors
such as affective state, general fatigue, cognitive load,
decision fatigue, interruptions and distractions, sleep
deprivation and sleep-debt, are influential too. Other
individual factors such as personality, intelligence,
rationality, gender and other variables also impact
decision making. Since our judgments are so vulner-
able to biases and so many different factors affect
decision making, the challenge of developing clinical
decision makers who consistently make optimal and
reliable decisions appears daunting. Two questions
need to be answered: can we improve our perform-
ance by using cognitive debiasing to repair incorrect
judgments made under the influence of bias? This
means appropriately alerting the analytical mode to
situations in which a bias might arise so that it can be
detected and a debiasing intervention applied.
Second, can we mitigate the impact of adverse
ambient conditions, either by improving conditions in
the decision making environment, or by changing the
threshold for detection of bias and initiating debiasing
strategies?
THE ORIGINS OF COGNITIVE BIASES
There appear to be a prevailing assumption that biases
are all created equal, that all are difficult to overcome
and that some common debiasing strategy might
work. However, as Larrick points out, many biases
have multiple determinants, and it is unlikely that
there is a ‘one-to-one mapping of causes to bias or of
bias to cure’20; neither is it likely that one-shot debias-
ing interventions will be effective.21 From DPT and
other work of cognitive psychologists we know that,
although biases can occur in both types of processes,
most biases are associated with heuristics and typically
are Type 1 (intuitive) processes. Other theories of rea-
soning exist, but DPT has become prevalent, gaining
increasing support including from functional MRI
studies.22 DPT has been used as a template for the
diagnostic process (figure 1).23
In the figure, the intuitive system is schematised as
Type 1 processes and the analytic system by Type 2
processes. There are eight major features of the
model:
1. Type 1 processing is fast, autonomous, and where we
spend most of our time. It usually works well, but as it
occurs largely unconsciously and uses heuristics heavily,
unexamined decision making in the intuitive mode is
more prone to biases.
2. Type 2 processing is slower, deliberate, rule-based and
takes places under conscious control, which may prevent
mistakes.
3. The predictable deviations from rationality that eventu-
ally lead to errors tend to occur more frequently in the
Type 1 processes, in line with findings of dual-process
researchers in other domains.24–26
4. Repetitive processing using Type 2 processes may allow
processing in Type 1. This is the basis of skill acquisition.
5. Biases that negatively affect judgments, often uncon-
sciously, can be overridden by an explicit effort at
Figure 1 Dual process model for decision making. From: Croskerry23 (T is the toggle function, which means that the decision maker
is able to move forth and back between Type 1 and Type 2 processes).
Narrative review
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reasoning. Type 2 processes can perform an executive
override function—which is key to debiasing.
6. Excessive reliance on Type 1 processes can override Type
2, preventing reflection and leading to unexamined deci-
sions—this works against debiasing.
7. The decision maker can toggle (T) back and forth between
the two systems—shown as broken line in figure 1.
8. The brain generally tries to default to Type 1 processing
whenever possible
These operating characteristics have been described
in more detail elsewhere.22 23 27 The model does not
imply that one single reasoning mode accounts for a
diagnostic decision or that a particular mode is always
preferable over the other one. Current thinking is that
making diagnoses usually involves some interactive
combination of intuitive and analytical processing in
different degrees.28 And whereas in some circum-
stances a high degree of System 1 processing may
work well or be even lifesaving, such as in imminent
life-threatening conditions, in others a high degree of
reflection (System 2) may be required. Optimal diag-
nostic reasoning would appear to be a blend of the
two reasoning modes in appropriate doses.22 Further,
not all biases originate in Type 1 processing, but when
a bias does occur it can only be dealt with by activat-
ing Type 2 processing. Thus, a good balance of Type 1
and Type 2 processes is required for a well-calibrated
performance.
Importantly, the intuitive processes are multiple and
varied. Stanovich29 has recently categorised these
‘autonomous’ Type 1 processes according to their
origins, and describes four main groups (figure 2).
1. Processes that are hard-wired. These were naturally
selected (in the Darwinian sense) in our evolutionary
past for their adaptation value. Examples of such ‘innate’
heuristics that may induce biases are: the metaheuristics
(anchoring and adjustment, representativeness, availabil-
ity), search satisficing, overconfidence and others.
2. Processes that are regulated by our emotions. These too
may be evolved adaptations (hard-wired) and are
grouped into six major categories: happiness, sadness,
fear, surprise, anger and disgust.30 Fear of snakes, for
example, is universally present in all cultures. Or they
may be socially constructed (acquired, learned), or com-
binations of the two—hard-wired modified by learning
for example, visceral reactions against particular types of
patients.31
3. Processes that become firmly embedded in our cognitive
and behavioural repertoires through overlearning. These
might include explicit cultural and social habits, but also
those associated with specific knowledge domains. An
example of a bias acquired through repetitive exposures
might be a ‘frequent flyer’ in a family doctor’s office or
in the emergency department where the bias may be the
expectation that no significant new diagnosis will be
found.
4. Processes that have developed through implicit learning.
It is well recognised that we learn in two fundamental
ways. First, through deliberate explicit learning such as
occurs in school and in formal training, and second,
through implicit learning which is without intent or con-
scious awareness. Such learning plays an important role
in our skills, perceptions, attitudes and overall behaviour.
Implicit learning allows us to detect and appreciate inci-
dental covariance and complex relationships between
things in the environment without necessarily being able
to articulate that understanding. Thus, some biases may
be acquired unconsciously. Medical students and resi-
dents might subtly acquire particular biases by simply
spending time in environments where others have these
biases, even though the bias is never deliberately articu-
lated or overtly expressed to them that is, the hidden
curriculum. Examples might be the acquisition of biases
towards age, socioeconomic status, gender, race, patients
with psychiatric comorbidity, obesity and others.
Although Type 1 processes appear the most vulner-
able to bias and suboptimal decision making, they are
not the only source of impaired judgment. Cognitive
error may also arise through biases that have become
established through inferior strategies or imperfect
decision rules. Arkes points out that error due to
biases also occurs with Type 2 processes,32 that is,
even though the decision maker may be deliberately
Figure 2 Origins of biases in Type I processes. This is a modified section of the dual process model of diagnosis expanding upon
the origins of Type 1 processes (based on Stanovich).27
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and analytically applying accepted strategies or rules,
they may be flawed. Thus, there may have been a
problem in the initial selection of a strategy which
may then underestimate or overestimate a diagnosis.
Of the two, it would seem preferable to always over-
estimate (as in the forcing strategy ‘rule out worst case
scenario’) so that important diagnoses do not get
missed; however this can sometimes be wasteful of
resources. Generally, suboptimal strategies get selected
when the stakes are not high.
Situation-dependent biases: An important question
is: are there situations in which biases are more likely?
Evidence suggests that certain conditions such as
fatigue, sleep deprivation and cognitive overload, pre-
dispose decision makers to using Type 1 processes.33 In
addition, specific clinical situations might increase vul-
nerability to specific biases. Some will set the physician
up for exposure to particular biases whereas others will
produce exposure to a wide range of biases. Some
common situations are described in table 1.
How does debiasing work? While debiasing is an
integral part of everyday living, some will do better
than others. Those who are successful learn the conse-
quences of their actions and take steps to avoid falling
into the same thinking traps. Often this can be done
using forcing strategies or deliberately suppressing
impulsivity in certain situations. We can’t find our car
keys at a time when we are in a hurry, so many of us
learn the forcing strategy of always putting them in a
specific place as soon as we arrive home. In some
situations, we can adopt simple, protective forcing
rules whenever we are going to do something irrevers-
ible for example, by following the maxim ‘measure
twice, cut once’. In other domains, we have come to
know that it is a good idea to suppress belief and be
sceptical when we are offered deals that are too good
to be true such as the email notifying us we have just
won a large sum of money. Interestingly, increased
intelligence does not protect against such follies.29
Wilson and Brekke,35 in their extensive review, refer
to cognitive bias as ‘mental contamination’ and
debiasing as ‘mental correction’. They suggest an algo-
rithmic approach, delineating a series of steps to avoid
bias (figure 3). Bazerman sees the key to debiasing is
first that some disequilibrium of the decision maker
needs to occur so that the individual wants to move
from a previously established response and change.36
This could come about by the individual simply being
informed of a potential bias, or that their past judg-
ment has raised the possibility they might be biased,
or by developing insight into the adverse conse-
quences of bias. This critical step may be more than
simply becoming aware of the existence of biases and
their causes; sometimes a vivid, perhaps emotion-
laden experience needs to occur to precipitate cogni-
tive change. The next step involves learning how the
change will occur and what alternate strategies need
to be learned. Finally, the last step occurs when the
new approach is incorporated into the cognitive
make-up of the decision maker and (with mainten-
ance) becomes part of their regular thinking behav-
iour. An algorithmic approach has also been proposed
by Stanovich and West,37 in which they further delin-
eate characteristics of the decision maker needed
to inhibit bias. Importantly, the decision maker must
(1) be aware of the rules, procedures and strategies
(mindware)38 needed to overcome the bias, (2) have
the ability to detect the need for bias override, and
(3) be cognitively capable of decoupling from the bias.
Stanovich has examined the theoretical basis of
Table 1 High-risk situations for biased reasoning
High-risk situation Potential biases
1. Was this patient handed off to
me from a previous shift?
Diagnosis momentum, framing
2. Was the diagnosis suggested to
me by the patient, nurse or
another physician?
Premature closure, framing bias
3. Did I just accept the first
diagnosis that came to mind?
Anchoring, availability, search
satisficing, premature closure
4. Did I consider other organ
systems besides the obvious
one?
Anchoring, search satisficing,
premature closure
5. Is this a patient I don’t like, or
like too much, for some reason?
Affective bias
6. Have I been interrupted or
distracted while evaluating this
patient?
All biases
7. Am I feeling fatigued right now? All biases
8. Did I sleep poorly last night? All biases
9. Am I cognitively overloaded or
overextended right now?
All biases
10. Am I stereotyping this patient? Representative bias, affective bias,
anchoring, fundamental attribution
error, psych out error
11. Have I effectively ruled out
must-not-miss diagnoses?
Overconfidence, anchoring,
confirmation bias
Adapted from Graber:34 General checklist for AHRQ project.
A description of specific biases can be found in Croskerry.7
Figure 3 Successive steps in cognitive debiasing (adapted
from Wilson and Brekke).35 Green arrows=yes; Red arrows=no
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debiasing in considerable depth.29 He proposes that a
critical feature of debiasing is the ability to suppress
automatic responses in the intuitive mode by decoup-
ling from it. This is depicted in figure 1 as the execu-
tive override function. The decision maker must be
able to use situational cues to detect the need to over-
ride the heuristic response and sustain the inhibition
of the heuristic response while analysing alternative
solutions,37 and must have knowledge of these alter-
native solutions. These solutions must of course have
been learned and previously stored in memory as
mindware. Debiasing involves having the appropriate
knowledge of solutions and strategic rules to substi-
tute for a heuristic response as well as the thinking
dispositions that are able to trigger overrides of Type
1 (heuristic) processing.
Caveats are abundant in medical training and at its
completion we are probably at our most cautious due to
lack of experience and high levels of uncertainty.
Experience subsequently accumulates but does not guar-
antee expertise. However, many clinicians will develop
their own debiasing strategies to avoid the predictable
pitfalls that they have experienced, or have learned
through the experience of others. Morbidity and mortal-
ity rounds may be a good opportunity for such vicarious
learning, provided that they are carefully and thought-
fully moderated. These rounds tend to inevitably remove
the presented case from its context and to make it
unduly salient in attendees’ minds, which may hinder
rather than improve future judgment.
Although a general pessimism appears to prevail
about the feasibility of cognitive debiasing,3 clearly
people can change their minds and behaviours for the
better. While evidence of debiasing in medicine is
lacking, shaping and otherwise modifying our beha-
viours, extinguishing old habits, and developing new
strategies and approaches are features of everyday life.
Overall, we are faced with the continual challenge of
debiasing our judgments throughout our careers. In
our second paper, we review a number of general and
specific strategies that have been grouped under the
rubric of cognitive debiasing.
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